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MAKING THE WORLD A BETTER PLACE
THROUGH TORT LAW?: THROUGH THE
THERAPEUTIC LOOKING GLASS
Daniel W. Shuman*
L Introducion
While discussion of many fields of law of interest to lawyers
does not occupy a central role in the popular media or public debate,
that is not so for tort law. Tort law was a frequent topic in the last
presidential election and is a subject about which many members of
the lay public have strong feelings. William Prosser's observation
that tort law is social engineering aptly explains why it touches a
cultural nerve.' From automobile accident and professional
malpractice litigation to sexual abuse or harassment and defamation,
tort law transcends class, culture, and region to affect virtually every
segment of society. It shapes the way we relate to each other both in
public and in private. Increasingly, the tort reform debate has
become highly politicized, with few new insights. What is needed to
move the tort reform debate forward is a new set of insights.
Therapeutic jurisprudence is one approach that may offer those new
insights.
The insights therapeutic jurisprudence offers to tort law
depends upon what is meant by therapeutic jurisprudence. David
Wexler and Bruce Winick, whose writings have defined therapeutic
jurisprudence, describe it as an interdisciplinary, empirical
examination of the role of the law as a therapeutic agent.2 It seeks
© Copyright 1993 by the New York Law School Journal of Human Rights.
Professor of Law, Southern Methodist University, Dallas, Texas. This article is
a revised version of a paper presented at the New York Law School Conference on
Therapeutic Jurisprudence, April 23, 1993. Research for this paper was supported by
a grant from the M.D. Anderson Research Fund. Emily Atlas, Joel Dvoskin, Michael
Perlin, and David Wexler provided helpful comments on an earlier draft of this work.
I WILLIAM PROSSER, HANDBOOK OF THE LAW OF TORTS § 3, at 15 (4th ed. 1971).
2 David B. Wexler & Bruce J. Winick, Introduction to ESSAYS IN THERAPEUTIC
JURISPRUDENCE at xi (David B. Wexler & Bruce J. Winick eds., 1991).
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to focus on the therapeutic consequences of legal decisionmaking,
illuminated by empirical scrutiny.3 The resulting scrutiny is not
intended to exalt these therapeutic consequences above others, rather
it is to ensure that they are not neglected. "The premise that a rule
or practice is antitherapeutic, like the premise that a rule is
inefficient, does not support the conclusion that the rule should be
changed in the absence of an agreed-upon (although perhaps
unarticulated) normative major premise. ,4
To describe therapeutic jurisprudence as interdisciplinary and
empirical is helpful, yet that characterization does not distinguish it
from other jurisprudential schools that have extensively examined tort
law including law and economics. What is seemingly distinctive
about therapeutic jurisprudence, as its moniker implies, is its
therapeutic concern. Yet, in answering one question, this distinctive
therapeutic concern raises another, for it is given to at least two
meanings that each suggests a different focus; it may be concerned
with specific health related outcomes or it may be a metaphor for
generally good results. Therapeutic jurisprudence scholarship to date
has focused on the former, specific mental health related outcomes,
that overlap with the intellectual turf of traditional mental health law
scholarship. This focus has implications for the impact of therapeutic
jurisprudence on tort law, which has its own therapeutic agenda, and
on the broader corpus of legal thought.
11. The Coincidental Goals of Therapeutic Jurisprudence and
Tort Law
The focus of therapeutic jurisprudence on the overlap with
traditional mental health law scholarship is, in some large part,
linguistic.5 In the dictionary and in common parlance, 6 the word
3 Id.
41d.
I See, e.g., JAMES B. WHITE, HERACLES Bow: ESSAYs ON THE RHETORIc AND
POETICS OF THE LAW 40-44 (1985) (explaining that the rhetoric of law is a language).
6 WEBsTER's THIRD NEw INTERNATIONAL DICTIONARY OF THE ENoLISH LANOUAOE
UNABRIDOED 2372 (1981) (defining therapeutic as "[o]f or relating to the treatment of
disease or disorders by remedial agents or methods").
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therapeutic conjures up a curative result that implies a beneficial
health related outcome in the particular way that an efficacious mental
health therapy may achieve a beneficial result. Animated by this
emblem, therapeutic jurisprudence appears to be concerned with
specific therapeutic consequences of legal rules, i.e., examining the
consequences to patient mental health that result from legal rules that
recognize the right of patients to receive treatment or the right of
patients to refuse treatment. 7
This focus on a specific mental health therapeutic good is
convenient and understandable. The intellectual turf is familiar for
mental health law scholars and it offers the opportunity for an
interdisciplinary, empirical perspective. It looks to empirical research
from the perspective of mental health professionals to gain their
insights about what legal rule is most likely to result in a therapeutic
outcome. Empirical research is, at least in theory, viable to ascertain
the therapeutic impact of a given legal rule.
Several examples of this specific mental health therapeutic
jurisprudence agenda illustrate familiar mental health law issues
readily recast as therapeutic jurisprudence. Debate over civil
commitment criteria has involved discussion of -the importance of
voluntary and involuntary patient status. Therapeutic jurisprudence
focuses the debate on the individual and systemic benefits of patient
status. What are the therapeutic consequences of a legal rule that
encourages voluntary rather than involuntary psychiatric
hospitalization; do voluntary patients experience better outcomes from
hospitalization than involuntary patients?' Debate over civil
commitment procedure has focused on the historical vacillation
7 See Bruce J. Winick, Competency to Consent to Voluntary Hospitalization: A
Therapeutic Jurisprudence Analysis ofZinermon v. Burch, 14 INT'L J.L. & PSYCHIATRY
169, 172 n.18 (1991); see also David B. Wexler, Health Care Compliance Principles
and the Insanity Acquittee Conditional Release Process, 27 CRIM. L. BuLL. 18, 19 n.5
(1991).
' See Mary L. Durham & John Q. LaFond, A Search for the Missing Premise of
Involuntary Therapeutic Commitment: Effective Treatment of the Mentally Ill, 40
RuTGERS L. REv. 303, 356 (1988); Winick, supra note 7, at 192-99. See generally
Susan Reed & Dan Lewis, The Negotiation of Voluntary Admission in Chicago's State
Mental Hospitals, 18 J. PSYCHIATRY & L. 137 (1990) (exploring the consequences of
Illinois' Mental Health Code which discourages the involuntary commitment of mental
health patients).
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between the legal and the medical model. Therapeutic jurisprudence
focuses the debate on the benefits of the process. What are the
therapeutic consequences of a legal rule that requires adversarial
involuntary hospitalization proceedings; do involuntary patients
committed in adversarial legal proceedings experience better
outcomes from hospitalization than involuntary patients committed in
nonadversarial proceedings?9 Plea bargaining has dominated the
criminal justice system and its impact on offenders, particularly sex
offenders is an important concern. Therapeutic jurisprudence focuses
the debate on the consequences of this process. What are the
therapeutic consequences of a legal rule that requires sex offenders
to acknowledge their abusive behavior in plea bargains; do defendants
who have acknowledged their abusive conduct in plea bargains have
better outcomes than those who plead without acknowledging their
abusive conduct?1" These examples of therapeutic jurisprudence
analysis of specific health related outcomes view the subject matter
of traditional mental health law scholarship through a therapeutic
lens.
A therapeutic jurisprudence agenda including a broader
metaphorical therapeutic good is simultaneously more promising and
more problematic than a narrow specific therapeutic focus. Just as
racist and sexist attitudes built on myth and misinformation have
engendered fear and intolerance, so sanist attitudes about mentally ill
persons have isolated them in the popular and legal cultures.1" If
therapeutic jurisprudence includes a broader agenda of beneficial
outcomes, it promises to expand therapeutic jurisprudence beyond a
scholarship addressed to a population most choose to ignore.
' See generally John J. Ensminger & Thomas D. Ligouri, The Therapeutic
Significance of the Civil Commitment Hearing: An Unexplored Potential, 6 J.
PSYCHIATRY & L. 5, 5-7 (1978) (expressing the belief that the present adversarial
commitment process can have an antitherapeutic effect on the patient's mental health);
Tom R. Tyler, The Psychological Consequences of Judicial Procedures: Implications for
Civil Commitment Hearings, 46 SMU L. REv. 433, 445 (1992) (concluding that the
judicial commitment procedures should be responsive to both the quality of the decisions
made and to the psychological consequences of the procedures).
10 Jeffrey A. Klotz et al., Cognitive Restructuring Through Law: A Therapeutic
Jurisprudence Approach to Sex Offenders and the Plea Process, 15 U. PUGET SOUND
L. REV. 579, 584 (1992).
11 Michael L. Perlin, On "Sanism", 46 SMU L. REv. 373, 343-345 (1992).
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Yet, a broader agenda of beneficial outcomes is more
problematic for numerous reasons. If therapeutic jurisprudence
describes legal analysis that seeks a good or beneficial outcome, then
it looses a distinctive appeal. Applied outside the sphere of
traditional mental health law, the interdisciplinary, empirical focus of
therapeutic jurisprudence may be dismissed as the proverbial old wine
in a new bottle-reconstructed legal realism. Defining the goals of
therapeutic jurisprudence in broader, metaphorical terms makes the
empirical analysis of the therapeutic consequences of legal rules
exceedingly difficult. For example, while it is one thing to measure
the impact of a legal rule on patients keeping therapy appointments,
it is quite another to measure the impact of a legal rule on people
taking greater responsibility for their decisions.
Tort law, in particular, is fertile ground to explore this
dilemma. The goals of tort law have been articulated in numerous
ways that share two common, conjunctive elements-deterrence and
compensation. 12 These goals are manifest in the requirements for
recovery. To recover in tort, plaintiffs must establish both liability
and damages. Standing alone, neither deterrence nor compensation
is sufficient to trigger tort sanctions.
Deterrence in tort law focuses on defendants and seeks to
reduce injury. Plaintiffs are not compensated merely because they
are injured by the defendant's conduct, they must also establish the
defendant's liability. A finding of liability is a determination that the
defendant's conduct fell below the level of care that society expects
and proximately caused the plaintiffs injuries. Tort law attempts
specific and general deterrence, through its message of tort sanctions,
to decrease the level of injury in society.
Compensation in tort law focuses on plaintiffs and seeks to
restore the injured. Plaintiffs are not compensated merely because
the defendant's conduct is in need of deterrence, they must also
establish the plaintiff's injury. Compensation, in an effort to make
the plaintiff whole, is a rough translation of injury to dollars. Tort
law seeks, through its award of damages, to restore the injured.9.
2 See David G. Owen, Deterrence and Desert in Tort: A Comment, 73 CAL. L.
REV. 665, 666 (1985); Richard J. Pierce, Jr., Institutional Aspects of Tort Reform, 73
CAL. L. REv. 917, 917 n.1 (1985); George Priest, Modern Tort Law and Its Reform,
22 VAL. U. L. REV. 1, 5 (1987).
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Tort law has a natural affinity for therapeutic jurisprudence.
Tort law need not be recast to advance a therapeutic dimension; it
posits a therapeutic agenda of its own. Tort law's agenda for both
deterrence and compensation are therapeutically driven-injury
avoidance and restoration of the injured.
IlL The Unexamined Premise: Why Tort Law Benefits From the
Therapeutic Looking Glass
Although tort law posits a therapeutic agenda of its own, it
may nonetheless be a beneficiary of therapeutic jurisprudence's
interdisciplinary, empirical looking glass. Tort law's interdisciplinary
focus is often lacking or myopic. In tort law, for the past twenty-five
years, interdisciplinary scholarship has meant law and economics,13
which is troubling not only for its myopia, but also for its behavioral
assumptions that have yet to be validated. 4 Tort law's insights have
often lacked empirical support or have been contrary to existing
empirical evidence. "Much discussion of the tort litigation system
consists of conclusory assertions, unsupported by evidence."15
Underlying the deterrence theory of tort law is the assumption
"that the imposition of liability substantially affects how categories of
"3 See William M. Landes & Richard Posner, THE ECONOMIC STRUCTuRE OF TORT
LAW (1987); STEVEN SHAVELL, ECONOMIC ANALYSIS OF ACCIDENT LAW (1987). See
generally GuIDo CALABRISI, THE COST OF ACCIDENTS (1970) (explaining the theoretic
foundation of accident law); R.H. Coase, The Problem of Social Cost, 3 J. L. & EcoN.
1 (1960) (analyzing flaws in the law and economics theory of tort law).
14 "Most 'law and economics' treatments . . . incorporate unvalidated behavioral
assumptions, such as rational utility maximization or a continuous Bayesian refinement
of subjective probability estimates, that are amenable to mathematical formulations but
may not correspond to real behavior in many settings." Howard A. Latin, Problem
Solving Behavior and Theories of Tort Liability, 73 CAL. L. REv. 677, 677 n.2 (1985);
see lierbert A. Simon, The Behavioral and Social Sciences, 209 SCIENCE 72, 74-77
(1980) (summarizing the empirical research that people do not act in ways suggested by
these economic theorists).
"S See Michael J. Saks, Do We Really Know Anything About the Behavior of the Tort
Litigation System-And Why Not?, 140 U. PA. L REv. 1147, 1155-56 (1992) (little
formal, systematic data about civil justice system exists and frequently debates about the
tort system do not even attempt to gather the limited data that does exist).
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actors respond to the risks they create or confront." 6 This approach
to tort law is based upon a model of people as rational self-
maximizing decisionmakers. The deterrence goal of tort law rejects
a normative explanation for behavior, in which tort law plays an
informative rather than a coercive role. Tort law assumes, without
inquiry into the literature of psychiatry or psychology, that people are
aware of the potential of tort sanctions and consequentially choose
safer behavior to avoid these sanctions.17
In the face of a blistering attack on the deterrent capacity of
fault-based tort law and the ensuing discussion of alternative
deterrence mechanisms, 8 therapeutic jurisprudence offers new light,
rather than more heat to that debate. What is the relationship
between tort law and human behavior generally and therapeutic
behavior specifically?19 How should tort law best be structured to
shape human behavior to achieve a therapeutic good? Therapeutic
jurisprudence offers to add new insights to a debate that has become
mired in partisan rhetoric.
Critics have focused on inefficiency and inconsistency in tort
compensation to argue for alternate compensation mechanisms. The
critics have noted that the fault-based tort system fails by not
compensating those injured by defendants who are not at fault; fails
by not compensating those injured by defendants who lack assets or
insurance; fails by not compensating those with minimal injuries that
make prosecution economically unfeasible for plaintiff's lawyers; fails
by not compensating when the responsible defendant cannot be
identified; fails by undercompensation of major loss and
overcompensation of minor loss;2" and, fails by expending a large
I6 Latin, supra note 14, at 677.
17 Daniel W. Shuman, The Psychology of Deterrence in Tort Law, 42 KAN. L. REV.
115, 131-32 (1993).
11 See, e.g., Symposium, Alternative Compensation Schemes and Tort Theory, 73
CAL. L. REv. 548, 549 (1985) (stating that as a result of the debate in the 1960's
through the 1970's, new mechanisms were proposed which were based upon the
principle of broadening social responsibility instead of the highly individualistic fault-
based tort law).
"9 See Daniel W. Shuman, Therapeutic Jurisprudence and Tort Law: A Limited
Subjective Standard of Care, 46 SMU L. REv. 409, 409-12 (1992).
2o Saks, supra note 15, at 1220.
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percentage of compensation dollars on lawyers fees and other
externalities.21
What is most troubling about this criticism is not its validity,
but instead that it obscures a core question presented by a
compensation system that links recovery to proof of fault-how does
fault-based tort compensation affect the injured?22 Is there a cogent
reason to link compensation to proof of fault? Is fault based
compensation therapeutic or anti-therapeutic for claimants? Changing
compensation systems may entail more than changing the amount of
compensation or the method of payment. Adoption of a no-fault
system may shape the restorative process independent of changes in
the amount of dollars paid.23 Even within the context of fault-based
compensation, the decision to cap payment for non-economic loss
or to permit court-ordered periodic payments,25 for example, may not
only shape the amount of payment, but also how it affects the
restorative process. Yet, the debate about compensation generally
21 In auto accident litigation, for example, for every dollar expended $.52 goes to
the plaintiff, $.24 for plaintiff's legal expenses, $. 13 for defendant's legal expenses, and
$.13 to other miscellaneous costs. DEBORAH R. HENSLER Er AL., TRENDS IN TORT
LmoATIoN: THE STORY BEHIND THE STATISTICS 27 (1987). See JAMES S. KAKALIK &
NICHOLAS M. PACE, COSTS & COMPENSATION PAID IN TORT LITIGATION at vi (1986)
(estimating that slightly less than half of the $29 to $36 billion cost of tort litigation in
1985 compensated injury victims).
' In negligence and intentional torts, fault based liability is explicit. Although fault
is purportedly not a consideration in strict products liability, under a different label, it
plays a major role in these determinations. Plaintiffs in strict products liability cases
must still prove that the product was defective. The test for defective products operates
much like the test for negligence. See James A. Henderson & Theodore Eisenberg, The
Quiet Revolution in Products Liability: An Empirical Study of Legal Change, 37 UCLA
L. REv. 479, 488-498 (1990). Thus, even with the presence of strict liability, it is
accurate to characterize tort law in the United States as a fault based liability system.
23 See, e.g., JEFFREY O'CONNELL, THE INJURY INDUSTRY AND THE REMEDY OF No
FAULT INSURANCE 95-105 (stating the three key aspects that guarantee the success of a
no-fault system: 1) eliminate the endless and expensive arguing over who was at fault
in the accident; 2) pay only out-of-pocket loss and not payments for pain and suffering;
and 3) deal with one's own insurance company instead of a hostile stranger).
24 See STEPHEN J. CARROLL, ASSESSING THE EFFECTS OF TORT REFORMS (1987);
Neil K. Komesar, Injuries and Institutions.: Tort Reform, Tort Theory, and Beyond, 65
N.Y.U. L. REV. 23, 31-38 (1990).
1 See Roger C. Henderson, Designing A Responsible Periodic-Payment System for
Tort Awards: Arizona Enacts A Prototype, 32 ARiz. L. REv. 21, 31-38 (1990).
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focuses on valuation of injury26 and seldom entails rigorous
examination of how tort compensation affects the restorative process.
Tort law is not unique among fields of law in its penchant for
making assumptions about its impact on human behavior without
empirical support. 7 What is particularly troubling about these
uninformed hunches in tort law, however, is that tort law often
involves an accommodation of competing legitimate interests. Tort
law often presents questions not of good versus bad, but rather
between relative goods. Therapeutic jurisprudence offers the
potential of a more careful accommodation of these competing
interests.
See Randall R. Bovbjerg et al., Valuing Life and Limb in Tort. Scheduling "Pain
and Suffering", 83 Nw. U. L. REv. 908, 911 (1989); see also Ellen Smith Pryor, The
Tort Law Debate, Efficiency, and the Kingdom of the ll." A Critique of the Insurance
Theory of Compensation, 79 VA. L. REv. 91, 125-136 (1993) (discussing the importance
of the distinction between pecuniary and non-pecuniary losses); Ted R. Miller,
Villingness to Pay Comes of Age: Will the Sstem Survive?, 83 Nw. U. L. REv. 876,
898 (1989) (discussing the development of a schedule that would indicate impairment
compensation according to injury).
' See Alexander Tanford, The Limits of a Scientific Jurisprudence: The Supreme
Court and Psychology, 66 IND. L. J. 137, 142-43 (1990) (discussing the Court's
reluctance to use psychological research in issues involving juror behavior and trial
procedure).
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IV. Deterrence Through the Therapeutic Looking Glass
A. Specific Therapeutic Good Within the Context of Mental
Health Law
The mental health law scholarship addressed to tort law issues
that began in the late 1960's and ended in the late 1980's sought to
use the law to change the practice of mental health professionals.
The agenda for mental health law tort scholars included a now
familiar litany of duty to warn or protect, negligent release, and
informed consent issues. That scholarship subsided, in part because
it achieved its goals, in part because a conservative mood swept the
country, and in part because the intellectual turf was well plowed.2"
That the end of that generation of scholarship was closely followed
by therapeutic jurisprudence scholarship is hardly coincidental. A
number of mental health law scholars turned to therapeutic
jurisprudence because there was little left to say of the earlier
generation of mental health law scholarship, or few still willing to
listen, and because therapeutic jurisprudence captured a thoughtful,
transcendent perspective of that earlier generation of scholarship not
allied with a particular political agenda.
Rather than using the insights of analogue scholarship in the
courts to arm wrestle mental health professionals, therapeutic
jurisprudence critically plumbed mental health research to examine
the therapeutic consequences of legal rules.29 Since many mental
health law scholars turned to therapeutic jurisprudence as traditional
mental health law scholarship waned, it is not surprising that their
therapeutic looking glass often focused upon the same issues and
relationships that had been the subject of the earlier generation of
mental health law. One topic that has been a favorite subject of
therapeutic jurisprudence scholarship is the therapist-patient
relationship.
While rights-oriented tort scholarship dominated traditional
mental health law scholarship seeking to define the legal boundaries
' Daniel W. Shuman, Overview, 46 SMU L. REV. 323, 323 (1992) (overview of
Symposium, Psychological Jurisprudence: Another Perspective).
" See David B. Wexler, Therapeutic Jurisprudence and Changing Conceptions of
Legal Scholarship, 11 BEHAVIORAL SCL & L. 17, 20 (1993).
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of the therapist-patient relationship,"0 therapeutic jurisprudence
scholarship has given voice to some early calls for an empirical
perspective."1 Consider some examples within the context of mental
health law, of a new generation of interdisciplinary, empirical
scholarship focusing on the ways in which injury reducing therapeutic
behavior might be shaped by tort rules.
The Supreme Court of California's decision in Tarasoff v.
Regents of University of California3 2 addressing the duties of
therapists treating patients who pose serious risks to third persons has
dominated the tort law agenda for mental health scholars, but most
of that scholarship has devolved into a polemic. Accepting
Tarasoff's holding that the therapist owes a duty to protect or warn
endangered third persons as a part of the legal landscape within
which therapist-patient relations exist, Robert Schopp has examined
the empirical research on the dynamics of the therapist-patient
relationship to suggest a way in which Tarasoff might best be
therapeutically accommodated. Schopp proposes articulating a
"crystallized trigger"33 for that duty-to third persons that permits a
therapist to put the patient's interest first, absent "specific threats
against identifiable victims." 34  Schopp's approach seeks to shape
Tarasoff to advance complimentary injury-reducing, therapy outcome
related therapeutic goals.
Child abuse reporting laws have proliferated over the past
twenty years based on the assumption that reporting is therapeutic and
" See John G. Fleming & Bruce Maximov, The Patient or His Victim: The
Therapist's Dilemma, 62 CAL. L. REv. 1025, 1026-31 (1974).
31 DANIEL W. SHUMAN & MYRON F. WEINER, THE PSYCHOTHERAPIST-PATIENT
PRIVILEGE: A CRrrICAL EXAMINATION 145 (1987); see David Wexler, Patient,
Therapist, and Third Parties: The Victimological Virtues of Tarasoff, 2 INT'L J. L. &
PSYCHIATRY 1, 1-2 (1979).
32 551 P.2d 334, 340 (Cal. 1976).
33 Robert F. Schopp, The Psychotherapist's Duty to Protect the Public: The
Appropriate Standard and the Foundation in Legal Theory and Empirical Premises, 70
NEB. L. REv. 327, 355 (1991).
1 Id. See generally Michael L. Perlin, Tarasoff and the Dilemma of the Dangerous
Patient: New Directions for the 1990's, 16 LAW & PSYCHOL. REv. 29 (1992)
(articulating the impact of the Tarasoff case).
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invariably reduces the risk of injury to children. 5 Based largely on
anecdotes, therapists have often argued that they should be excepted
from this requirement to advance their own therapeutic agenda to
reduce abuse by treating abusers without the negative consequences
to the relationship they contend are engendered by mandatory
reporting. 6 Murray Levine and his colleagues have conducted
empirical studies of these competing claims to explore the
consequences of mandatory child abuse reporting laws on the conduct
of psychotherapy. 7 Levine's research explores the therapist's anti-
therapeutic claims about the consequences of a law that seeks to
reduce injury to children and informs the debate over changes in
mandatory reporting laws.
Although much of the focus of therapeutic jurisprudence in
the field of tort law has centered on the therapist-patient relationship,
there is no reason to so limit its reach. Consider an example of some
of the unique insights that therapeutic jurisprudence may have for a
broader range of tort/mental health law questions. One growing area
in tort litigation is child sexual abuse claims.3" Although some of
these claims are brought against institutions such as schools or day
care centers which have assets or insurance to satisfy a judgment,
many are not. A critical issue in many of these cases seeking
substantial damages against defendants who lack the personal capacity
to satisfy a large judgment, is the availability of homeowners
insurance policies to satisfy a judgment for acts of abuse.39 Courts
" Daniel W. Shuman, The Duty of the State to Rescue the Vulnerable in the United
States, in THE DUTY TO RESCUE 131 (Michael A. Menlowe & Alexander McCall Smith
eds., 1993).
' Murray A. Levine, A Therapeutic Jurisprudence Analysis of Mandated Reporting
of Child Maltreatment by Psychotherapists, 10 N.Y.L. SCe. J. HUM. RTs. 713 (1993)
(this issue); Murray A. Levine et al., Informing Psychotherapy Clients of the Mandate
to Report Suspected Child Maltreatment (APLS San Diego, March 14, 1992); Holly
Watson & Murray A. Levine, Psychotherapy and Mandatory Reporting of Child Abuse,
59 AM. J. ORTHOPSYCHIATRY 246 (1989).
' Watson & Levine, supra note 36.
38 LEONARD KARP & CHERYL L. KARP, DOMESTIC TORTS: FAMILY VIOLENCE,
CONFLICT AND SEXUAL ABUSE § 4 (1989).
" See Christine Cleary, Comment, Litigating Incest Torts Under Homeowners's
Insurance Policies, 18 GOLDEN GATE U. L. REv. 539, 540 (1988); see also Janet K.
Colonri & Delinda R. Johnson, Coverage for Parents' Sexual Abuse, 34 FOR THE DEF.
2,4 (March 1992).
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now resolve this question by resort to the policy language and general
principles of insurance contract interpretation. Given the ambiguous
language of most of these policies, therapeutic jurisprudence offers
relevant insights to inform policy determinations. Is a particular legal
rule interpreting coverage for acts of abuse associated with an
increase or decrease in the incidence of abusive behavior? What is
the impact, if any, on the deterrent effect of tort sanctions of a rule
that expands coverage or limits exclusionary language and permits the
abuser/homeowner to pass along the loss? Given our understanding
of abuse, is it reasonable to expect contingent consequences to affect
abusive behavior?"0 Similar questions may be raised regarding claims
for spousal abuse and transmitting sexual diseases.
These queries only scratch the surface of what may be learned
about the specific therapeutic aspects of the deterrent effect of tort
law viewed through the looking glass of therapeutic jurisprudence.
The lessons to be learned have relevance not only for tort law's effect
on mentally ill persons. The role of the standard of care in shaping
the behavior of people with and without mental illness is ripe for
therapeutic jurisprudence examination.4
In exploring these issues, therapeutic jurisprudence scholars
would be well advised to avoid the elitism that has often colored
examination of the therapist-patient relationship from the perspective
of the professional, rather than the client.42 To consider the
therapeutic consequences, the interests of both must be taken into
account. Murray Levine's work is a good example of a non-
' Richard I. Lanyon, Theories of Sexual Offending, in CLINICAL APPROACHES TO
SEX OFFENDERS AND THEIR VICTIMs 37-39 (Clive R. Hollin & Kevin Howells eds.,
1991).
41 Shuman, supra note 19, at 417-419.
42 There is a developing body of legal scholarship on the impact of tort liability on
those who treat the mentally ill. Ironically, the therapeutic consequences of tort liability
on the mentally ill has escaped direct scrutiny. This approach sends an implicit message
that reinforces a model of learned helplessness for mentally ill persons. It teaches that
the locus of control for mentally ill persons is external rather than internal. To address
the problems of the clients each profession is intended to serve, the legal profession
focuses on the problems of the mental health profession, without directly addressing the
client/patient's interests. The appropriate inquiry ought to consider the therapeutic
consequences of tort liability on the mentally ill.
Shuman, supra note 19, at 412.
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hierarchical approach that gives voice to patient as well as therapist
concerns.
B. General Therapeutic Good Without the Context of Mental
Health Law
It makes sense that initial forays in therapeutic jurisprudence
took place "within core content areas of mental health law. "43 But,
if therapeutic jurisprudence is not to become as inbred as its
predecessor, it must speak to a larger audience about a broader range
of issues. The risk in so doing, however, is that it may lose its focus
or unique niche. The risk of not so doing, however, is that its
unique insights will not be perceived widely.
Using therapeutic jurisprudence as a metaphor to examine the
deterrent impact of tort law beyond the boundaries of mental health
law reveals a host of issues as broad as tort law itself. Noting but a
few provides a sense of the potential for therapeutic jurisprudence
scholarship on the deterrence of tort law generally.
An overarching issue for a therapeutic jurisprudence analysis
of the general good that may result from the deterrent effect of tort
law is an interdisciplinary, empirical examination of how tort law
shapes behavior. I began that examination in an article entitled The
Psychology of Deterrence of Tort Law.' That examination questions
the efficacy of the deterrent capacity of tort law as presently
structured, and points to numerous issues that may benefit from a
therapeutic jurisprudence analysis to improve tort law's deterrent
capacity.45
4 Wexler & Winick, supra note 2, at x.
Shuman, supra note 17, at 117.
4 The organic and biological theories reveal the limited capacity of tort law to deter
unsafe behavior. The psychodynamic psychological theories prove too much and
threaten to weaken deterrence by excusing responsibility for much behavior that is now
viewed as tortious. Cognitive psychology reveals that our decisionmaking is
systematically flawed, and that faulty information processing is the norm. Thus, the risk
of tort sanctions is not likely to induce safer behavior in appropriate cases. Rather,
cognitive psychology reveals that we are likely to overestimate tort risks and avoid
desirable activity, or underestimate tort risks and behave unsafely. The behaviorists'
insight suggests that the tort system's use of delayed punishment rather than immediate
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Although the architects of tort law have never explicitly
addressed what theory of human behavior underlies their assumption
that tort sanctions are likely to deter unsafe behavior, behavior
modification or its variant, social learning theory seems the closest
fit." Although these theories differ in some regards, they share the
premise that to shape behavior its consequences should be known and
certain. This premise has important implications for a therapeutic
examination of deterrence in tort law. Consider several examples that
illustrate the potential of therapeutic jurisprudence to enhance the
deterrent capacity of tort law.
Ninety to ninety-five percent of all civil cases are settled
without trial.4 7 Trials are idiosyncratic; they occur when cases fall
outside understood normative patterns. And, tort law has generally
permitted parties to settle in secret."' Thus, the largest, most valid
body of tort data about societal expectations is not required, or even
allowed to be publicly available. Permitting secret settlement
agreements limits what is known about the tort consequences of
behavior. The impact on deterrence of the secrecy of settlement
agreements is a subject that may benefit from a therapeutic
jurisprudence analysis.
The importance of certainty of tort sanctions for deterrence of
undesirable behavior is an important lesson to be learned from an
examination of the psychology of deterrence. Although Oliver W.
positive reinforcement is not an effective means of shaping desirable behavior. Social
learning theory holds potential, but unless better communication of tort law occurs and
the percentage of meritorious tort cases brought is increased so that tort sanctions are
observable with greater regularity in the case of tortious behavior, this theory suggests
that the tort system is likely to increase rather than decreasethe frequency of undesirable
behavior. Id. at 165-66.
46 The tort system posits a negative reinforcement structure; people are sanctioned
for unsafe behavior but not sanctioned for safe behavior. Because behaviorist theory
maintains that attempts to influence behavior should involve positive rewards or
reinforcement rather than negative rewards or contingent punishments, an attempt to
explain the psychological underpinning of tort deterrence necessarily focuses on social
learning theory that proposes that punishment, as well as positive reinforcement, can be
effective in changing behavior. Shuman, supra note 17, at 157.
' David M. Trubek et al., The Costs of Ordinary Litigation, 31 UCLA L. REv. 72,
89 (1983).
' See Brian T. Fitzgerald, Note, Sealed v. Unsealed: A Public Court System Going
Secretly Private, 6 J. L. & POL. 381, 381-84 (1990).
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Holmes, Jr. argued for crystallizing jury findings into fixed tort law
rules,49 tort law has rejected this approach, preferring instead case by
case determinations. Recent attempts at federal product liability rules
have breathed new life into this debate."0 The impact of crystallized
tort law standards"1 on the deterrent effect of tort law is another
subject that would benefit from a therapeutic jurisprudence analysis.
In addition to therapeutic jurisprudence's general insights for
tort law's deterrence mechanism, it also has insights for areas of tort
law previously unexamined by mental health scholars. One area of
tort law not often addressed by mental health law scholars is product
liability law, a subject teeming with issues for therapeutic
jurisprudence analysis. One set of interdisciplinary, empirically
grounded mental health insights that is particularly relevant to product
liability law is attribution theory. Attribution theory explains
behavior as a function of people's perception and understanding of
events.5 2 Learned helplessness occurs when people attribute success
or failure to events outside themselves. A therapeutic jurisprudence
analysis might consider, for example, the insights attribution theory
has for the deterrent consequences of a product liability rule that
places the responsibility on the manufacturer for foreseeable product
misuse.5 3 Do tort rules that hold product manufacturers liable for
consumer misuse send a message of learned helplessness that results
in people taking less responsibility for their actions? Attribution
theory might also be a useful approach to examine the impact on
drinking and driving of innkeeper and guest-host liability rules that
hold servers of alcoholic beverages liable for automobile accidents
cause by their intoxicated patron/guests.'
49 OLIVER W. HOLMES, JR., THE COMMON LAW 127-29 (1881).
o Linda Lipsen, The Evolution of Products Liability as a Federal Policy Issue, in
TORT LAW AND THE PUBLIC INTEREST: COMPETITION, INNOVATION AND CONSUMER
WELFARE 247 (Peter H. Schuck ed., 1991).
11 See Glen 0. Robinson & Kenneth S. Abraham, Collective Justice in Tort Law, 78
VA. L. REV. 1481, 1484-85 (1992).
5 Harold H. Kelly & John L. Michela, Attribution Theory and Research, 31 ANN.
REV. PSYCHOL. 457, 489 (1980).
s See Green v. Sterling Extruder Corp., 471 A.2d 15, 18 (N.J. 1984).
See Largo Corp. v. Crespin, 727 P.2d 1098 (Colo. 1986) (discussing innkeeper
liability); Kelly v. Gwinnell, 476 A.2d 1219 (N.J. 1984) (discussing host liability).
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V. Compensation Through the Therapeutic Looking Glass
A. Speciflc Therapeutic Good Within the Context of Mental
Health Law
The subject of a specific therapeutic good through tort
compensation necessarily includes the ability to diagnose and value
mental injury. Although not typically associated or identified with
therapeutic jurisprudence, there is a body of research that has
examined the ability to diagnose and value legally relevant mental
injury.55 What is most troubling about this scholarship is that it has
often failed to reach legal decisionmakers who continue to rely on
myth and stereotype in fashioning rules that govern mental injury.5 6
The challenge of therapeutic jurisprudence is to communicate this
research to legal policymakers to encourage informed decisions about
the therapeutic consequences of rules for compensation for mental
injury, not based on myths or stereotypes.
B. General Therapeutic Good Without the Context of Mental
Health Law
Therapeutic jurisprudence analysis of a general good in tort
compensation without the context of mental health law involves
compensation questions that transcend diagnosis or valuation of
mental injury. An important and generally ignored question in the
evolution of systems of compensation that separate payment of
compensation and the responsibility for causing injury, is the impact
of fault based tort compensation on restoration. Do plaintiffs who
receive compensation from defendants after a determination of fault
experience a beneficial restorative effect that is different than
claimants who receive equivalent dollar compensation through first
55 See TOM GRISSo, EVALUATING COMPETENcIEs: FoRENsIc ASSESSMENTS AND
INSTRUMENTS at vi (1986); Richard Rogers & James L. Cavanaugh, "Nothing But the
Truth . . . A Reexamination of Malingering", 11 J. PSYCMATRY & L. 443, 443-47
(1983).
m Perlin, supra note 11, at 400-01.
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party insurance or a no-fault statutory compensation system?' 7 If so,
what is the nature of this benefit? Do plaintiffs experience a sense of
empowerment from exposing the wrong or asserting power over the
injurer through the judicial system? Do plaintiffs experience an
opportunity to vent resentment? 8 Do plaintiffs experience a sense
of vindication from societal condemnation of the defendant? 9 Do
plaintiffs experience a sense of altruism based upon a belief that the
lawsuit has prevented this injury from happening to others' How
does the experience of plaintiffs who receive tort compensation
compare with the experience of victims whose assailants are
successfully prosecuted under the criminal law?
Are there anti-therapeutic consequences to tort compensation?
Does tort litigation encourage claimants to delay their restoration? Do
plaintiffs use tort litigation to displace or avoid addressing important
personal issues? What are the therapeutic consequences of tort
litigation for plaintiffs who settle privately, lose, or think that they
have been undercompensated?
If there is a beneficial restorative difference, is it experienced
by all plaintiffs compensated by the tort system or just those who are
victims of abuse of power or breach of fiduciary relationships such
as child sexual abuse or therapist-patient sex?6  What of such claims
brought against third parties whose wrongful conduct was failure to
protect the victim from the assailant? What of automobile accidents,
which are the accidental injuries most likely to result in a tort claim,62
but which lack an abuse of power or breach of fiduciary relationship?
57 Daniel W. Shuman, The Psychology of Compensation in Tort Law 3 (Oct. 23,
1993) (unpublished manuscript, on file with author).
' Albert A. Ehrenzweig, A Psychoanalysis of Negligence, 47 Nw. U. L. REv. 855,
867 (1953).
11 See generally Renee L. Binder et al., Is Money a Cure? Follow-up of Litigants in
England, 19 BULL. AM. ACAD. PSYCHIATRY & L. 151, 154-55 (1991) (plaintiff
"accomplished what [she] wanted" when there was a television show about her accident
which alerted the public to the company that rented her the chainsaw involved in her
accident).
6 Id.
"1 Bruce Feldthusen, Sexual Battery as Therapeutic Jurisprudence, 25 OTrowA L.
REV. (forthcoming 1994).
6 DEBORAH R. HENSLER ET AL, COMPENSATION FOR ACCIDENTAL INJURIES IN THE
UNITED STATES 175 (1991).
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What of claims where the parties may never meet, even at the time
of the accident, as for example in product liability claims? How will
this benefit, if any, change where the victim and the injurer share a
sense of community?
The effect of fault-based compensation on the restoration of
the injured has not been the subject of rigorous study. The closest
area of research contains the relatively few studies that examine the
impact of the termination of the litigation on claimants' psychological
symptoms, i.e., secondary gain.63 The few studies that do exist
arrive at opposite conclusions. While some, 'find a dramatic
improvement in symptoms following the litigation, others find that
significant symptoms continue after the termination of the litigation. '
Although the studies differ on the impact of termination of the
litigation, they consistently show an association of the reduction of
post-accident psychopathology with "a shorter time between accident
and settlement, a longer time after [the] settlement of the lawsuit, and
having less severe symptomatology after the accident."65 The time
between accident and resolution of the claim is within the control of
tort law, thus therapeutic jurisprudence provides support for
expeditious resolution of claims. This corresponds with the
importance of celerity emphasized by behavior theorists to modify the
behavior of injurers."
The one unambiguous conclusion from this research speaks
more to delay in tort compensation than anything inherent in joining
compensation with fault. It fails to examine what psychological role
fault determinations play for plaintiffs' restoration. If plaintiffs
dramatically improve after their tort claims are resolved, that
improvement is consistent with both secondary gain and tort
compensation having a beneficial restorative impact. If plaintiffs
dramatically improve following the receipt of tort compensation it
may be because the anti-therapeutic effect of the litigation has ended
or because the therapeutic effect of the litigation has occurred.
Ascertaining the difference sharpens the issue for tort reform-one
interpretation points in the direction of reducing the role of tort law,
Binder, supra note 59, at 154.
Id. at 152.
6 Id.
' Shuman, supra note 17, at 152-53.
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the other in the direction of expanding it. This facet of the tort
system calls out for a more thoughtful examination and therapeutic
jurisprudence has much to offer to this discourse.
VI. Conclusion
It is not necessary to reconcile therapeutic jurisprudence and
tort law. They are already reconciled. Therapeutic jurisprudence
and tort law share a common agenda, although academics and
practitioners are only just becoming aware of this commonality. To
the extent that this awareness now exists it is in the overlap of tort
law and traditional mental health law scholarship. Yet the promise
of therapeutic jurisprudence is not likely to be fulfilled unless it
breaks the chains of traditional mental health law scholarship and
enters the mainstream of jurisprudential analysis.
